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1. Introduction 
 
Economic and financial crises and labour market insecurity have affected 
fertility dynamics over the past decades. Research shows that fertility levels tend to 
decline in response to economic downturns (Sobotka et al., 2011).  
We aim to compare the effect on fertility of two ten-year-lagged crises from two 
very distant territorial contexts: the Asian economic crisis that started in 1997 and 
the recent economic downturn that started in 2007. We will also address the extent 
of the fertility impact of the recession among the different socioeconomic groups 
(Kim, 2007; Kertzer et al., 2009). Attention is given also to the aim to construct a 
theoretical model of differential fertility. 
The interest in comparing South Korea and Italy is that they are both 
characterized by a “tight family system” but very low fertility levels, as well as by 
by low levels of illegitimate births, divorces, and non-marital childbearing rates 
(Gabrielli, Choe, 2008). The traditional family system in South Korea is based on 
Confucian ideals. In addition, strong generational ties are very important in family 
relations (Kim, 2005). Italy is a Catholic countries that have a strong family system 
in which “the family group has had priority over the individual” (Reher, 1998).  
 
 
2. The Asian and European economic crises and their effects on fertility 
 
The 1997 Asian economic crisis has exerted a profound impact on family 
behaviors (Kim, 2009). Countries in East and South-East Asia have experienced a 
marked postponement and decline in marriage, which has accounted for a large 
portion of their fertility decline in recent decades (Jones, 2007). In South Korea, 
the high unemployment due to increased insecurity in the labor market and the 
expansion of poverty after the crisis have influenced the timing and magnitude of 
marriage and childbearing. The singulate mean age at marriage of women rose 
from 25.5 in 1996 to 28.7 in 2009; the number of marriages and the crude marriage 
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rate, declined after a peak of 434,911 and 9.4 per thousand, respectively, in 1996 to 
309,759 and 6.2 per thousand in 2009. The mean age at first birth rose from 26.9 in 
1997 to 29.8 in 2009. The fertility rate for women aged 25-29 dropped 8.9% in the 
years immediately post-crisis, and 50.1% during the period 1997-2009 (Statistics 
Korea, 2014). TFR in South Korea dropped from 2.57 births per woman in 1981 to 
a replacement level of 2.06 by 1983, and to 1.30 in 2012. Despite slight upturns in 
2000, 2006, and 2007 (largely due to an anomaly in the data resulting from the 
beliefs of many of South Koreans on the auspiciousness of these birth years being 
the best in the Asian Zodiac cycle of the lunar calendar), this fertility transition has 
become even clearer after the 1997 economic crisis. In 2005, TFR was estimated at 
1.08, the lowest rate ever recorded.  
Since 2007, the economic recession spread from the United States of America  
is hitting Europe when many countries had just started to see modest increases in 
their period fertility rates. Goldstein et al. (2013) suggested that first births are 
most strongly affected by increasing aggregate unemployment rates; this impact is 
particularly hard for Southern European countries further exacerbating the 
problems young people face in this region. Italy is among the European countries 
most affected by the strong reduction of income mainly due to a steadily growing 
unemployment rate (De Rose, Strozza, 2015). The number of total births has been 
decreasing continuously, from 576,659 in 2008 to 534,186 in 2012 and the TFR 
(equal to 1.42 in 2008 and in 2012) would decline if not sustained by foreign 
women (ISTAT, 2012a). The mean age of mothers at birth rose from 31,1 in 2008 
to 31,4 in 2012. Moreover, the number of marriages sharply declined after 2008 
passing from 246,613 to 207,138 in 2012; the crude marriage rate declined from 
4.1 per 1000 inhabitants in 2008 to 3.5 in 2012 with a slight increase in the 
singulate mean age at marriage of women (around 33 years of age). A comparison 
with the Korean case - that has been observed for a longer period - would help in 
interpreting this relationship and the impact of the crisis among different 
socioeconomic groups. 
 
 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses  
 
Interest in the effect of socioeconomic status (SES) on fertility is not recent. 
Education, income and other indicators have been considered as the most important 
determinants of fertility at both the micro and macro level (see, among others, 
Easterlin, 1975). Wrong (1958) argued that three different types of relation 
between SES and fertility represent different stages in the process of transition. The 
negative and linear pattern of the relationship yields first to a reverse J-shaped 
curve, which is later succeeded by a U-shaped pattern. Ultimately, populations with 
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low fertility are characterized by the emergence of a positive relation between 
socioeconomic status and fertility (Wrong 1958). In addition, a cubic relationship 
between SES and fertility has been observed, suggesting that the range of the 
fertility curve is dependent on the SES of a specific country (Kim, 1987).   
More recently, observing South Korean fertility levels before and after the 
economic crisis, Kim (2007; 2009; 2013) demonstrated (see the blue curve of 
children ever born (CEB) in Figure 2(a)) that, before the crisis, as SES (represented 
by high family income, education of the wife or occupational prestige of the 
husband) rises, opportunity cost and desire for relative goods that have negative 
effects on demand for children also increase; in addition, the economic utility of 
children declines as SES rises. Without being constrained by these factors, 
however, a couple in the highest socioeconomic group can afford to have more 
children, and demand for children increases again as SES rises above a certain 
point. Kim has also argued that, after the economic crisis, the model hypothesizing 
the relationship between SES and fertility should be changed (see the red curve in 
Figure 2(b)). It is postulated that the reverse J-shaped pattern of the relationship 
between SES and fertility was succeeded by a slightly positive relationship. For the 
highest socioeconomic group, however, the relationship is likely to become a 
slightly negative one: fertility is likely to decline slightly as SES rises above a 
certain point. Moreover, it is assumed that a decrease in CEB is most drastic among 
those in the low socioeconomic group with a high level of fertility but relatively 
slow for those with a low level of fertility. A remarkable increase in 
unemployment, layoffs, and part-time and temporary jobs has played a decisive 
role in delaying marriage and widening the birth interval, particularly among those 
with low SES. Increasing inequality has also led those in the highest 
socioeconomic group to be exposed to and spend more status-related and status-
differentiating expenditures (which compete with children for the couple’s 
income), thus reducing their fertility. As a result, level of fertility is likely to be 
highest among those with upper-middle SES, followed by those with the highest 
SES, and finally those with the lowest status. 
Based on the approach mentioned in the theoretical background, we aim to test 
whether the following three hypotheses, already verified for the South Korean case 
(Kim, 2007; 2009; 2013), also fit the Italian one, that is in another ultra-low 
fertility context. The first hypothesis is drawn from the old model shown in Figure 
1(a), and the next two hypotheses are from the new model shown in Figure 1(b). 
1) Those with low and middle SES are likely to have fewer CEB as SES rises. 
For the highest socioeconomic group, CEB is likely to rise slightly as SES rises.   
2) In an ultra-low fertility context, the relationship SES and level of recent 
fertility is slightly positive. For the highest socioeconomic group, the level of 
recent fertility is likely to decrease slightly as SES rises. 
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3) Decrease after the recessions has been most drastic among those with the 
highest level of fertility but relatively slow for those with a lowest level of fertility. 
 
Figure 1 – Hypothesized Relationship between Socioeconomic Status and Fertility. 
 
     (a) The Old Model        (b) A New Model for Ultra-Low Fertility Contexts 
Source: Kim (2013). 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
The main data sets used come from the 2006 Korean National Fertility, Family 
Health and Welfare Survey (KIHASA, 2006) and from the 2012 Italian 
Multipurpose Survey on Aspects of Everyday Life (ISTAT, 2012b). Our sample 
focuses on women aged 25-44 currently married at the time of the survey. 
The observed South Korean sample focuses on 4,739 women and is divided into 
two groups. The first group contains 2,829 women who married before 1997 or 
who remarried regardless of their timing of marriage. The second group includes 
1,910 women who married for the first time in 1997 or thereafter. The Italian 
sample includes 3,085 women and is divided into two groups as well. The first one 
encompass 2,441 women who married before 2007 or who remarried regardless of 
their timing of marriage; the second one consists of 644 women who married for 
the first time in 2007 or thereafter.  
The number of CEB and the post-crisis CEB are estimated in both countries in 
order to analyze recent changes in the level of fertility. Post-crisis CEB is estimated 
at the timing of a year after the beginning of the crisis: 1998 for Korea and 2008 
for Italy. Patterns of socioeconomic differentials in CEB for these two groups are 
also compared. It is postulated that the patterns of socioeconomic differentials in 
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CEB and the post-crisis CEB will not be similar if the economic crisis significantly 
affected the causal mechanisms of fertility. 
We conducted descriptive analyses in order to summarize the distinctive 
socioeconomic characteristics of the two observed groups of women in South 
Korea and Italy. In our analyses, formal educational level was used as a proxy for 
socioeconomic status. In addition, we conducted regression analyses to assess the 
effect of SES on CEB and to verify the hypotheses cited above. 
 
 
5. The observed South Korean and Italian populations 
 
The basic demographic profiles of the observed South Korean and Italian 
populations are presented in Table 1. With regard to the South Korean population, 
the mean CEB for the entire sample is estimated at 1.8. Dividing the observed 
women into two subgroups, the figures for those married before 1997 or remarried 
(Group A) is 2.0, and for those married for the first time in 1997 or thereafter 
(Group B) is 1.3. The mean post-crisis CEB for the entire sample is 0.8, and 0.4 
and 1.3 for Group A and Group B, respectively. 
The Italian population analyzed shows that the differences in the mean CEB 
values between the different observed groups are similar to the South Korean one. 
In fact, the CEB levels are 1.6 for the entire sample, 1.7 for those married before 
2007 or remarried (Group A) and 0.8 for those married for the first time in 2007 or 
thereafter (Group B). The values of the mean post-crisis CEB are lower than the 
South Korean ones, being equal to 0.4 for the entire sample, to 0.3 for Group A and 
0.6 for Group B.  
 The mean age of South Korean husbands and wives in Group A is higher than 
in Group B of 8.0 and 7.3 years, respectively. In contrast, the husbands and wives 
in Group B turn out to have gotten married at older ages compared to their 
counterparts in Group A of 2.1 and 2.7 years. The age of Italian husbands and 
wives in Group A is higher than in Group B of 6.2 and 5.5 years, respectively. 
With reference to the age of husband and wife at marriage, those in Group A 
married at a younger age (28.5 years of age for husbands and 24.7 for wives) than 
those in Group B (32.7 and 29.6 years of age, respectively). The delay is of 4.2 
years for men and of 4.9 years for women.  
The two Korean groups show differing characteristics. Kim (2013) summarized 
these differences as follows. Group B is relatively younger than Group A with a 
level of educational attainment that is much greater. College education was attained 
for about 55.6% of wives and 64.4% of husbands in Group B. Junior high school 
education or lower characterized only 1.1% of wives and 0.9% of husbands. These 
were much lower than the 8.4% and 7.1% achieved for Group A. The distribution 
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of the Korean husband’s occupations in the two groups is also correlated with 
educational attainment. The largest occupational subgroup in Group A was craft 
workers, while in Group B were professionals. The proportion of wives not 
employed was 44.9 percent for Group A and 62.4 percent for Group B.  
 
Table 1 – Demographic profile of the Study Population. 
 Currently married (aged 25-44) 
 
(Group A) 
Married before 
crisis 
(Group B) 
First married during or 
after crisis 
 
Total 
 
S. Korea 
(2,829) 
Italy 
 (2,441) 
S. Korea 
(1,910) 
Italy 
(644) 
S. Korea 
(4,739) 
Italy 
(3,085) 
CEB 2.0 1.7 1.3 0.8 1.8 1.6 
Post-Crisis CEB 0.4 0.3 1.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 
Husband’s age at interview 42.9 42.2 34.9 36.0 39.7 40.9 
Wife’s age at interview 39.6 38.4 32.3 32.9 36.7 37.2 
Husband’s age at marriage 27.6 28.5 29.7 32.7 28.5 29.4 
Wife's age at marriage 24.3 24.7 27.0 29.6 25.4 25.7 
Source: KIHASA (2006); ISTAT (2012b) 
 
Service workers constituted the largest group of working wives for Group A, 
while the proportion of professionals was found to be the greatest in Group B. 
Among the Italian sample, the level of education of persons in Group B is 
higher than those in Group A. In fact, 41.3% of wives and 42.6% of husbands in 
Group B have college education, while 25.2% of wives and 31.0% of husbands 
have junior high school education or lower. The percentages corresponding to the 
interviewees with a low educational level in Group A (39.1 for wives and 45.4 for 
husbands) are higher than the counterpart figures of Group B. Also in Italy, the 
distribution of the husband’s occupations both in the Group A and in the Group B 
is correlated with educational attainment. 
Observing Italian husbands’ occupation, in Group A, unskilled workers are the 
most numerous group. The professional distribution of men in Group B shows that 
the largest occupational groups are clerks and unskilled workers. The proportions 
of wives who do not work are 48.0 percent for Group A and 42.3 percent for Group 
B. Among the women with a job, in both groups clerks constitute the largest group. 
 
 
6. Distinctive patterns of CEB and the post-crisis CEB in South Korea and in 
Italy  
 
In this study, it was postulated that the pattern of socioeconomic differentials in 
fertility after the Asian and the European recessions are expected to be significantly 
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different from those at pre-crisis times.  
Figure 2(a) shows that CEB and the post-crisis CEB according to wife’s 
education reveal contrasting patterns, both in South Korea and in Italy. As wife’s 
education reaches a certain level, CEB decline in both countries. Though the 
difference turns out to be very small, for South Korea, college graduates reveal 
higher CEB than those in the next group in the hierarchy. The decline of CEB as 
educational attainment rises is evident also for Italy, even if college graduates do 
not show the highest levels as an analogous group of South Korean women.  
The post-crisis CEB according to wife’s education shows a contrasting pattern 
with respect to CEB in both the countries. With reference to South Korea, as the 
level of a wife’s education rises, the amount of CEB after the crisis increases. 
However, college graduated women are more likely to have slightly less children 
than the next group in the hierarchy. The same pattern is evident, although with 
less evidence, for Italy where the lower fertility of graduate women does not occur. 
To strengthen the above findings we conducted an analysis of differential fertility 
according to husband’s education. As shown in Figure 3(b), the pattern for both 
countries is found to be consistent with the results relative to women. 
Despite the existing differences between the two countries, the contrasting 
trends in CEB and the post-crisis CEB is notable. This pattern implies that, after 
the recession, fertility decline has been most remarkable among less educated 
couples, and relatively moderate for the most educated. The pace of fertility decline 
during the past decade has been negatively associated with the level of fertility. 
Thus, both South Korea’s and Italy’s descent to ultra-low fertility can mostly be 
attributed to the drastic reduction of fertility among the less educated women.  
We also conducted an analysis of differential fertility by comparing CEB and 
post-crisis CEB according to the occupations of the wife and husband. Generally 
speaking, the results (here not showed) demonstrate that in South Korea, as 
occupational prestige goes up, CEB shows a declining pattern, while professionals 
and senior managers with the highest prestige show a significantly higher mean 
CEB than those with the less prestigious group of occupations. The Italian trend is 
very similar to the South Korean one. In fact, as the couple’s occupation becomes 
more prestigious, the mean CEB tends to decrease. Husbands with professional 
jobs and couples with senior managerial jobs reveal higher CEB than those in the 
less prestigious groups. For both the considered countries, the pattern of the post-
crisis CEB according to occupational prestige contrasts remarkably with that of 
CEB. As the level of occupational prestige increases, the post-crisis CEB increases. 
However, in South Korea, senior managers with the highest occupational prestige  
have fewer children than those with the next prestigious jobs. This is also 
confirmed for Italy, where managers with the highest prestige tend to have fewer 
children than those of the next group in the hierarchy.  
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Both in South Korea and in Italy, analysis of the recent trends in fertility 
according to occupational prestige reveals a similar pattern to the ones according to 
the couple’s educational attainment.  
 
Figure 2 – CEB and Post-crisis CEB by Educational Attainment of Wife (a) and Husband 
(b), South Korea and Italy 
 
             (a) Wife                                                                              (b) Husband 
 
 
 
Source: KIHASA (2006); ISTAT (2012b) 
 
After the beginning of the Asian and the European economic crises, fertility 
decline has been most evident among groups with the highest level of fertility but 
relatively moderate among those with lower fertility. Results also confirm that the 
decline has been more substantial for those with the highest occupational prestige 
than those with the next prestigious group of occupations. 
To double-check the South Korean and Italian data supporting the above 
mentioned arguments on the pattern of socioeconomic differentials in fertility, we 
performed a series of regression analyses. Focussing on the effects of educational 
attainment of women on fertility, we introduced linear and quadratic terms of 
education years of wife into the regression model. This was done in order to 
examine the nonlinear relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables
1
. The results are shown in Table 2.  
For both countries, Model 1 and Model 3 on CEB yield a significantly negative 
coefficient for the linear term of wife’s education. Though it is statistically 
significant only for Italy, the quadratic term of wife’s education turns out to be 
                                                     
1 From an operative point of view, the variable of wife’s years of education was standardized in such a way that 
the resulting mean was zero and the resulting standard deviation was one. Then, the quadratic term was created 
by taking the squared value of the standardized variable. One of the advantages of this transformation is that the 
collinearity between the linear and quadratic terms is substantially reduced, while the correlation coefficients 
with the other variables are not affected by this transformation. For more detailed discussion of this technique of 
transformation and its applications, see Kim (1987: 154-159). 
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positive. The signs of the regression coefficients for these terms support the pattern 
of CEB hypothesized by Kim (2009; 2013) and previously postulated. Model 2 on 
post-crisis CEB shows for South Korea that the positive regression coefficient for 
the linear term and the negative regression coefficient for the quadratic term of 
wife’s education are statistically significant, and support the nonlinear pattern of 
the post-CEB postulated by Kim (2009; 2013) and summarized in the theoretical 
section of this paper. Model 4 shows how the Italian case is similar to the South 
Korean one, according to the positive regression coefficient. In contrast to the 
South Korean Model, however, the quadratic term in Model 4 shows a positive 
regression coefficient, though not statistically significant. This result implies that 
the pattern of the post-crisis CEB among Italian women is quite positively linear 
and is slightly different from the South Korean one. 
 
Table 2 – Regression Analysis to Examine the Nonlinear Relationship between Wife’s 
Education and Fertility 
 South Korea Italy 
 Dependent variable Dependent variable 
 
(Model 1) 
CEB 
(Model 2) 
Post-1998 CEB 
(Model 3) 
CEB 
(Model 4) 
Post-2008 CEB 
 b/beta b/beta b/beta b/beta 
Education_yr_wife_std ( − )** ( + )** ( − )** ( + )** 
Education_yr_wife_std_sq ( + ) ( − )** ( + )* ( + ) 
F ratio 83.59** 74.28** 63.99** 29.15** 
Number of cases 4,733 4,733 3,085 3,085 
Notes: 1) Considering that this analysis was conducted to examine the shape of the curvilinear relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variables, and that the independent variables were measured in a 
standardized form, this table only presents signs rather than the real numbers of the regression coefficients; 2) 
(Education_yr_wife_std) is a standardized variable of education years of wife; (Education_yr_wife_std_sq) is 
squared variable of (Education_yr_wife_std); 3) *: p＜0.05; **: p＜0.01 
Source: KIHASA (2006); ISTAT (2012b). 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
 
The aim of our article has been to analyze and compare the socioeconomic 
differentials of recent South Korean and Italian fertility. The investigation was 
grounded on two reflections. The first one concerns the importance of analyzing 
the changing pattern of relationships between SES and fertility. Moreover, in order 
to investigate the influence of the Asian and of the European economic crises on 
the level of fertility and on the pattern of socioeconomic differentials in South 
Korea and in Italy, we present a comparative analysis of CEB and the post-crisis 
232 Volume LXIX n. 2 Aprile-Giugno 2015 
 
CEB of married women in the two countries. The second reflection pertains to the 
need to build a theoretical framework of differential fertility based on new patterns 
of empirical findings in contexts of ultra-low fertility and recent economic crises. 
In fact, on the basis of the existing theoretical and empirical literature, we propose 
several hypotheses concerning fertility patterns and their differentials, testing them 
on two observed countries.  
The obtained findings show that the economic crisis affected the pattern of 
socioeconomic differentials in fertility significantly both in South Korea and in 
Italy. In particular, our results demonstrate that changes in reproductive behaviour 
after the economic crisis have been most evident among the women characterized 
by a high level of fertility and among those who received junior high school 
education or lower. This pattern was confirmed by observing husband’s occupation 
as an indicator of SES. Such results can be interpreted as follows: both in South 
Korea and in Italy, the poor economic conditions and serious job market insecurity 
due to the recession have led couples with low SES to reduce their family size 
more than couples with higher SES.  
As far as future research on these topics is concerned, one possible direction of 
theoretical development is to test our hypotheses on other countries that have 
experienced a similar economic crisis in different geographic, cultural and 
economic contexts. In fact, if the pattern of socioeconomic differentials in fertility 
undergo changes in the future among the countries characterized by ultra-low 
fertility and by the consequence of economic crises, there will be a need to describe 
and understand new reproductive behaviours. Therefore, this article can be 
considered an attempt to highlight the significance of this issue and to provide 
guidance for future scholarly endeavours. 
Lastly, with reference to population policies, we have to recall that both in 
South Korea and in Italy the presence of a gap between the achieved and the 
desired fertility have been found (Kim, 2013; De Rose et al., 2008). This 
unexpressed fertility can be an important additional basis to policy makers for 
focusing on pro-natal programs. Deeper research on recent changes in fertility 
could offer a base of knowledge to enhance the effectiveness of boosting fertility. 
In particular, the identification of selected groups of population that show a wider 
gap between achieved and desired fertility can facilitate the planning and 
implementation of policy measures aimed to narrow this gap.  
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SUMMARY 
 
Effects of the economic crisis on fertility: a comparison between  
South Korea and Italy 
 
 
Over the past decades, economic downturns have affected fertility dynamics in several 
countries in Asia and in Europe. The main purpose of this study is to perform a 
comparative analysis between South Korea and Italy on the effects of the economic crises, 
started respectively in 1997 and 2007, on the levels and patterns of fertility. A “tight family 
system” but very low fertility levels characterize both these two countries. The datasets 
used come from the 2006 Korean National Fertility, Family Health and Welfare Survey and 
from the 2012 Italian Multipurpose Survey on Aspects of Everyday Life. Our sample 
focuses on women aged 20-49 currently married at the time of the survey. We summarize 
the distinctive patterns in the socioeconomic characteristics of the observed groups of 
women in Italy and South Korea. We also apply regression analyses to assess the changing 
effect of economic status on fertility. Our findings confirm that the recession affected 
fertility significantly both in South Korea and in Italy. Changes in reproductive behavior 
have been most evident among women characterized by a high level of fertility and among 
those who received junior high school education or lower. As the level of wife’s education 
rises, the number of children ever born after the crisis tends to increase. 
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